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The Distinction Between Physics and Metaphysics in 
Duhem’s Philosophy
ROGELIO MIRANDA VILCHIS
Abstract
Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science has influenced many philosophers in the twentieth 
century, and even today. Many of the subjects he addressed are still highly discussed today, 
especially the distinction between science and metaphysics. My aim in this paper will be to 
motivate a naturalistic approach where the difference between physics and metaphysics is 
only a matter of degree. I focus on whether it would be possible to articulate this gradual 
distinction from a duhemian point of view. Although Duhem thought that metaphysics is an 
entirely different and more excellent activity than physics, I believe that Duhem’s philosophy 
of science also supports a naturalistic distinction in terms of degrees. I offer three reasons 
to justify this conclusion: (i) Duhem’s notion of common sense; (ii) Duhem’s holism and his 
views on the generality of our theories, and (iii) Duhem’s notion of natural classification. At 
the end of the paper I will argue that a naturalistic approach accomplishes must of what 
Duhem wanted to achieve with his distinction.
Keywords: distinction, Duhem, gradual, metaphysics, physics.
1. Introduction
According to Duhem, physics and metaphysics, particularly physical theory and metaphysical theory, are independent activities: “there is a distinction in kind between metaphysics and physics.”1 Physical 
theory cannot explain, which in Duhem’s terminology amounts to claim 
that it cannot tells how reality is in the most profound sense. Nonetheless, 
Duhem did not dismiss metaphysics (as was done by the positivists) as a 
meaningless enterprise, rather he understood metaphysics as an auton-
omous activity even greater in its excellence. He did it mainly for religious 
reasons. He supported a distinction between science and metaphysics 
with the objective to guard religious metaphysics from what appeared to 
* Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
  rogeliomv0101@gmail.com
1. Pierre Duhem, “Metaphysics and Physics,” in Essays in the History and Philosophy of 
Science, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Peter Barker (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1996), 29-49..
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him unwarranted extensions of scientific principles. He opposed the view 
that “no sensible person could accept the validity of science and believe in 
the dogmas of religion at the same time.”2 
In this paper, I will argue that some of our physical claims and 
concepts, through which we understand reality, have the status of meta-
physical claims. This is due to the nature of these concepts: their gener-
ality, which increases as a function of the amount of the application of the 
cognitive processes of abstraction (understood as elimination of details) 
and idealization (understood as the addition of details). So that it is not 
entirely right that metaphysics is completely distinguished from physics. 
Rather, we must see this distinction as matter of degree. We often call 
“metaphysical” the most theoretical statements we make, and “physical” 
the most concrete ones. But we lack clear criteria which supports a clear-cut 
distinction. Nonetheless, this gradual distinction would not undermine 
Duhem’s intuitive distinction, nor despise religious metaphysics as a 
meaningless activity. This partial agreement with Duhem is accomplished 
by the very general nature of metaphysical assertions and concepts.
I will proceed as follows: first, I will present the reasons Duhem 
has to distinguish physical theory from metaphysical theory. I will argue 
that Duhem entertains some views which do not imply this distinction. 
Although “it is not difficult to cobble together quotations form Duhem’s 
writing that make him sound as though he was uncompromisingly opposed 
to realism of any kind,”3 I think his writings give us the opportunity to 
view physical theory as a continuous approximation to the true nature 
of reality. Then, I will develop two duhemian theses: common sense and 
the general and holistic nature of physical theories. These theses, I think, 
undermine the aforementioned distinction, but motivate another kind of 
division: a gradualist and continuist one. In section 4, I will discuss why 
the duhemian notion of “natural classification” supports a gradualist and 
continuist view. Finally, I will show that a gradual distinction preserves 
most of what Duhem wanted to derive from his basic tenets.
2. Pierre Duhem, “Letter to Father Bulliot, on Science and Religion,” in Essays in the 
History and Philosophy of Science, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Peter Barker 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996a), 157-162.
3. Andrew Lugg, “Pierre Duhem’s Conception of Natural Classification,” Synthese 83, no. 
3 (1990): 416.
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2. The Inaccessibility of Metaphysics
Duhem is well known by his contributions to thermodynamics and 
physical chemistry. Among other things, he gave the first clear definition 
of a reversible process in thermodynamics, the first general proof of the 
Gibbs phase rule, and the Duhem-Margolis equations. He was also a 
remarkable historian of physics, known for his work on the continuity 
between medieval and modern science. But he is better known for his 
contribution and influence on the philosophy of science. Some of his 
main theses continue to be highly discussed. In effect, today, many of his 
theses (often found in his masterpiece “The Aim and Structure of Physical 
Theory”) have been modified and refined by many philosophers to support 
their own views on varied philosophical subjects. For example, his holistic 
conception regarding the testing of physical theories (extended by Quine 
to all domains of inquiry, in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”4 It was 
also espoused by Einstein. Howard5 observes that because of duhemian 
philosophy, Einstein eventually became dissatisfied with positivism); his 
thesis of the underdetermination of theory by the observable data (also 
extended by Quine6 and employed as a premise to justify the impor-
tance of talent, creativity, etc., in the construction of scientific theories by 
Feyerabend7 and Lakatos8), and his distinction between physics and meta-
physics (and more generally, between science and philosophy. This thesis 
had some influence on the views of the logical empiricists concerning the 
unverifiability of metaphysical claims. It also had an impact on instru-
mentalist and antirealist positions). 
We can find Duhem’s view on the necessity to distinguish physics 
from metaphysics in many of his works “Some Reflections of the Subject 
of Physical Theories”;9 “The English School and Physical Theories”;10 
4. W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 20-46.
5. Don Howard, “Einstein and Duhem,” Synthese 83, no. 3 (1990): 363-384.
6. Ibid. See also W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1992).
7. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method. (London: New Left Books, 1975).
8. Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-196. 
9. Pierre Duhem, “Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories.” in Essays in 
the History and Philosophy of Science, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Peter Barker 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996e), 1-28.
10. Pierre Duhem, “The English School and Physical Theories,” in Essays in the History 
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“Physics and Metaphysics,” his main work “The Aim and Structure of 
Physical Theory,”11 and many others. Duhem argues that physics is a 
discipline, a kind of theoretical discourse, which is independent of meta-
physics. This follows from the fact that physics is concerned specifically 
with observable facts and their nomological joining. It is “A system –a 
symbolic construction– designed to summarize in a small number of defi-
nitions and principles a set of experimental laws.”12
Metaphysics, on the other hand, is concerned with the very nature 
of those facts. In Duhem’s terminology, metaphysics is the investigation 
of the essence of things in their function of being the cause of physical 
phenomena. This coupled with the study of living things constitutes what 
he calls “cosmology”: 
Physics is the study of phenomena arising from brute matter and of the 
laws that govern these phenomena. Cosmology seeks to understand the 
nature of brute matter, considered as the cause of phenomena and as the 
foundation of physical laws.13
Duhem explicitly equates cosmology with peripatetic physics: the 
study of the motion of material things. Of course, physicists do not speak of 
changes from potential to actual, but “motion” is a reappearing concept in 
physics. Clearly, there are differences in the kind of categories the ancient 
philosophers and the modern physicists make use of. The ancients were 
not interested in discovering laws in its modern sense, nor were they inter-
ested in the mathematization of physical concepts (except for astronomy), 
which is now crucial in the construction of physical theories.
The aversion Duhem felt to any attempt to extract metaphysical 
conclusions from physical theories resulted in his rejection of mechanical 
models,14 and his skepticism about atomistic ontology. He saw them as 
attempts, or at least misleading theoretical tools, to uncover the real nature 
of things: their essence. He recommended physicists to acknowledge the 
real abstract and general nature of physical theory, from which it follows 
not a true description of reality, but an interpretation of it. To the extent 
and Philosophy of Science, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Peter Barker (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996f), 50-74.
11. Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. 2nd ed. and trans. Phillip 
Wiener (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).
12. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 14.
13. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 31.
14. Duhem, The English School and Physical Theories.
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that the human mind puts something of itself into the theory,15 it cannot 
be a completely true description or explanation of reality.
In addition to Duhem efforts to distinguish between physics and 
metaphysics, he is known for introducing a new way to understand 
physical theory: their holistic testing. This new perspective has become 
especially important in the twentieth century. This holism, specially its 
epistemic form, has influenced thinkers like Quine,16 Kuhn,17 Lakatos,18 
and many others. One of the most remarkable consequences of this 
approach to physics is the thesis that physical theory is underdetermined 
by the observable data. Of course, there is a big difference between what 
Duhem thought was underdetermined and its modern versions. For 
Duhem, underdetermination is restricted to physical theory. This property 
of physical theory guarantees, argues Duhem, the distinction in question. 
Underdetermination is commonly understood as the product of 
abstraction and interpretation. But it is also the result of the holistic 
testing of physical theories. Scientific hypotheses are not tested one by 
one but in conjunction. Presumably, it is theories that are tested as wholes 
(we will return to this in the next section). So, when testing a hypothesis –
which is taken to be a relation between physical magnitudes “expressed by 
mathematical propositions”19 – if we get unfavorable evidence we cannot 
tell exactly which hypothesis is wrong. Analogously, we cannot tell exactly 
which hypothesis is the responsible when we get favorable evidence. This 
is because all the hypotheses that conform to the theory are, in some way, 
intertwined to a certain degree. No one in isolation is answerable to the 
empirical evidence. Only the theory as whole can be tested. 
Although this underdetermination is not Duhem’s main argument for 
the distinction between physics and metaphysics, surely it is important 
to achieve that end. It is important to note that holism (and the gener-
ality of the theory) is seen as one consequence of the mathematization of 
physical theory. Mathematics allows the coordination of raw facts into an 
organized, systematized and elegant theory. It is also, argues Duhem, a 
symbolization of the facts. So, in the end, we get a general view of reality, 
but not of reality as it really is. Being physical theory only an interpretation 
15. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 11.
16. Quine, From a Logical Point of View. 
17. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1962).
18. Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. 
19. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 5.
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of facts,20 it cannot show us the bare truth, but just a modified version of 
it. The translation of the data by physical theory through mathematical 
symbolism results in a physical theory with an interconnected internal 
structure. This formalization of the data has a curious property: there is 
not a one-to-one correspondence between mathematical formalism and 
facts. It is also a consequence of the holistic structure21 of the theory that 
it must be tested as a whole.
Despite the presence of underdetermination, Duhem saw a kind of 
progress in physical theories. A succession of physical theories advances 
to a better classification of facts. Duhem himself takes a somewhat realist 
position when he claims that a natural classification can be established 
“as a sort of image and reflection of the true order according to which the 
realities escaping us are organized.”22
According to Duhem, physical theory cannot show us the essence of 
things, their nature. But, in a sense, it can show it indirectly by negation, 
“through the exclusion of all possible hypotheses except one.”23 Indeed, it 
is possible that Duhem had something like a proto structural realism in 
mind as Psillos24 suggests. Despite this, Duhem’s position is best under-
stood, I will argue, as suggesting that physical theory just approximates 
the real description of reality, being just that: an approximation. 
From such a standpoint, physics is distinguished from metaphysics. 
So, metaphysics consists of positive judgements that try to describe reality 
as it is. In contrast, in describing phenomena, physics can point to what 
things might be, once it is determined what they are not. This is another 
way to suggest that physical theories are only approximately true. So, in 
any case, this approximately-true characterization of physical theories 
can lead us, as we will see, to view philosophy and science as continuous. 
This is so because the lack of a clear borderline between both of these 
disciplines explains why physics approximates metaphysics.
This reference to natural classification allows us to hypothesize that 
a gradualist and continuist approach is not incompatible with Duhem’s 
20. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Experimental Physics, 78. in Essays in 
the History and Philosophy of Science, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Peter Barker 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996d), 75-111.
21. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 183.
22. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 31.
23. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 33.
24. Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (New York: Routledge, 
1999), 38.
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philosophy. Besides his notion of natural classification, we can also find in 
Duhem’s philosophy of science, other indications that metaphysics is not 
a completely disconnected activity from physics. This philosopher recog-
nizes some role for the study of phenomena in coming to grasp the deep 
nature of the world. However, knowledge of the substances, which are the 
cause of those phenomena, are not known completely. Duhem believes 
that:
When we ascend from effects to causes in order to obtain a meta-
physics, starting from some established physical knowledge, as perfect 
and extensive as one would like, we gain very incomplete and imperfect 
knowledge of the essence of material things.25
Duhem also employs another notion which suggests that physics and 
metaphysics can be connected: “common sense.” It is strongly connected 
with the notion of “intuition” and “good sense.” In speaking about the 
differences between the French and German minds, he claims that: 
Those whose lively good sense allows them to seize upon the truth and 
intuition as quick as it is accurate are sometimes also those who have 
the hardest time submitting themselves to the prudent discipline and 
rigorous deliberateness of the deductive method. On the other hand, 
those who follow most minutely the rules of the deductive method 
frequently fail through lack of common sense.26 
Duhem thought that the relationship between physical theory and 
common sense was one in which physics went beyond common sense. 
Physical theory is seen as a kind of interpretation of what is given in 
common sense. For Duhem, physical science consists in the mere coor-
dination of data, but it does not involve explanation. To explain some-
thing implies more, it must explain the real nature of things, but it cannot 
be accomplished by a mere coordination of facts. Nonetheless, all that 
physical theory can achieve is to enable us with useful tools to predict 
phenomena. Physical theory was, for Duhem, a kind of symbolic trans-
lation of sensory data.
Duhem also thought that physical theory presupposes common-sense 
truths. Actually, reasoning through and within common sense implies that 
we reason through common-sense categories. But, these categories of 
25. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 33.
26. Pierre Duhem, German Science, trans. John Lyon (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991), 11.
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reasoning usually go beyond what is given in experience. (Famous are the 
critics of “observation” provided by Hanson27 and Kuhn28). Interestingly, 
for Duhem common sense entailed the immediate perception of the general 
in the particular,29 as in “all men are mortal.” In effect, this sentence is, for 
Duhem, “one of the simplest and most certain of common sense laws.”30 
As we will see in the next section it is hard to avoid the consequence that 
our common sense is infected with theory and, as a consequence, with any 
metaphysical element theory carries with it.
As we have seen, there are some difficulties to establish a clear 
borderline between physical theory and metaphysical theory. These diffi-
culties spring form Duhem’s own views. So, it seems very likely that we can 
derive some metatheory linking together these two apparently dissimilar 
theoretical activities.
3. Holism and Generality
In this section, I will try to show how physical and metaphysical 
theories can be understood as a unique continuous theory about the 
world. My aim is not to argue that this continuist perspective is the only 
logical consequence we could derive from Duhem’s views. My goal is more 
restricted, I only want to motivate what seems to me a very reasonable 
consequence stemming from his views. I will focus mainly in the following 
three duhemian views:
(i) The employment of common sense at the start of scientific inquiry.
(ii) The holistic testing of physical theories and their generality.
(iii) The notion of natural classification.
In this section we will examine the first two. Let us begin with 
Duhem’s advocacy of common sense (i). The duhemian conception of 
27. Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1958).
28. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962).
29. Jaki, L. Stanley, Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987): 321.
30. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 165.
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common allows a link between physics and metaphysics. Common sense 
presupposes a complex common (or folk) theory, which is partially consti-
tuted by concepts that carry a metaphysical load (for example, as we will 
see, our ordinary concepts “time,” “motion,” and “body extension” entail a 
realist attitude about the referents of these terms).
Duhem implicitly endorses a metaphysics when he assumes that our 
common sense allows us to have contact with objective reality. He was 
somewhat a realist, to the extent that physical laws and theories,
Were steeped in metaphysics, and in particular in the metaphysics of a 
commonsense acceptance of external reality and its lawfulness. Duhem 
endorsed that metaphysics unreservedly and spoke of common sense 
and of external reality in terms which put his philosophy apart from 
positivism (Comte), from sensationism (Mach), and from commodism 
(Poincaré) […].31
Nevertheless, Duhem states that: “The experimental method rests on 
principles evident in themselves and independent of any metaphysics.”32 
Undoubtedly, Duhem thought that common sense is independent of meta-
physics, but it is hard to think how it can be the case, given the realist 
meaning (often being implicit rather than explicit) of common sense 
claims. 
Despite this antimetaphysical position, Duhem acknowledges the 
possibility of bringing these “principles evident in themselves” to the 
fore of metaphysical scrutiny. But they are analyzed from a metaphysical 
point of view carried out independently of physics. So, in the end, he saw 
no relationship whatsoever between physics and metaphysics. Yet, this 
position does nothing to avoid the introduction of metaphysical elements 
at the start of the scientific enquiry. We can find many of these elements 
even in Duhem’s description of the procedures of physics.
The experimental method is, for Duhem, independent of metaphysics. 
It is our primary access to reality, but it does not reveal the true nature 
of things. This last project belongs to metaphysics. The experimental 
method only deals with phenomena. The problem is that it seems as if 
the common sense involved in the experimental method deals with much 
more than just phenomena. This is because, as Duhem himself states, this 
method “employs a certain number of concepts, for example, the concepts 
31. Stanley, Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem, 320.
32. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 34.
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of ‘physical phenomenon’ and ‘physical law,’ ‘body extension,’ ‘time,’ and 
‘motion.’ It rests on certain principles, such as the axioms of geometry 
and kinematics and the existence of laws determining the connection 
of physical phenomena.”33 The only reason Duhem offers appeals to the 
certainty and distinctness with which these concepts appear to us. From 
this, Duhem derived the following conclusion “The experimental method 
rests on principles evident in themselves and independent of any metaphys-
ics.”34 
And yet, many would agree that these concepts presuppose a meta-
physical view. Concepts like “phenomenon,” “body,” “extension,” “time” 
and “motion” involve some kind of common sense metaphysics. Even 
if we agree with Duhem that physicists do not ask themselves for the 
metaphysical meaning of these concepts, one can call into question the 
duhemian presupposition that metaphysics is here disassociated from 
physics, especially from the experimental method. Quite the contrary, it 
is there from the very beginning. (Recently, Paul, L. A.35 has advanced 
a persuasive case for the conceptual and ontological priority of meta-
physical concepts over those of the sciences; e.g., those of physics). Our 
common sense implies a natural perspective about the world, which we 
can consider “metaphysical.” So, it seems unavoidable that, “the adoption 
of the experimental method itself involves ontological presuppositions.”36 
It seems perfectly reasonable that we start from some unanalyzed 
elements. The problem is that if physical theory begins amid metaphysical 
presuppositions, then it is difficult to say in which sense, we can be sure 
about the tenability of the duhemian distinction between physics and 
metaphysics. It could be objected that one way to avoid this problem is to 
ensure that the role these metaphysical concepts are doing is reduced to 
enabling us to begin scientific inquiry. But that these concepts do not play 
an epistemic or semantic role within physical theory per se. That is to say, 
it must not form part of the final theoretical product (physical theory). In 
this vein, Duhem notes that:
33. Ibid., 34.
34. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 34.
35. L. A. Paul, “Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale,” Philosophical Studies 
160, no. 1 (2012): 1-29.
36. Craig Dilworth. The Metaphysics of Science: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of 
Principles, Laws and Theories. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006.
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Often illusion inflames human activities more than the clear under-
standing of the object pursued. Is this reason for confusing illusion with 
truth? Admirable geographical discoveries have been made by adven-
turers seeking the Land of Gold. Does this meant that our maps should 
include El Dorado?37
Recently, Morganti and Tahko38 have argued that metaphysics and 
physics develop together in a continuous feedback. Although they think 
metaphysics is a priori, metaphysics helps physicists to delineate concep-
tually the starting point of the empirical research. Of course, common 
sense concepts represent a kind of implicit metaphysics, but Morganti and 
Tahko try to convince us that fully developed metaphysical concepts are 
also present. As an example, they bring forward the physical theory of 
infinite layers of three particles each leading toward Dirac point parti-
cles,39 prompted by the metaphysical concept of “gunk.” So, metaphysical 
concepts like this play an enabling role, which, nonetheless, preserves the 
autonomy of physics from metaphysics.
The theory advanced by Morganti and Tahko seems to be very good at 
explaining the relationship between physics and metaphysics. This theory 
implies that any metaphysics is heuristically valuable, but independent 
of physics. This metaphysics, includes any metaphysical notion imbued 
in common sense. Yet, there is still the possibility that the relationship 
between these activities be more than just the enabling role attributed to 
metaphysics. I suspect that physical theory can be carried out more or less 
independently of metaphysics, assuring a relative autonomy to the latter 
(as Morganti and Tahko want), but we can make sense of the distinction in 
terms of degrees, which will avoid the problem of explaining border cases 
that a clear-cut distinction must face. But before arguing for this, we have 
to analyze the second duhemian thesis: (ii) the holistic testing of physical 
theories and their generality.
Holism casts doubt on the hypothesis that the only role of common 
sense is to enable the production of physical statements, which, in the 
end, are independent of any metaphysics whatsoever present in common 
sense.
37. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 49.
38. Matteo Morganti and Tuomas Tahko, “Moderately Naturalistic Metaphysics,” Synthese 
194, no. 7 (2017).
39. Hans Dehmelt, “Triton, ...Electron, ...Cosmon, ...: An infinite regression?,” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of the Sciences USA, 86, no. 22 (1989): 8618-8619.
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Duhem believed that the holistic property of theories was given only 
in those which were highly mathematized, and in the narrow scope of 
the physical sciences. Duhem40 emphasized, particularly, the confirmation 
of physical theories given determined experimental results. These experi-
ments involve the use of the theory as a whole (hence the holism), and if 
the experiment gives a negative effect, the physicist must follow his good 
sense when it is necessary to reject one part of the theory, if not the whole 
theory. The source of error can come from any part of the theory: probably 
it is due to the impurity of the chemical elements; the perturbations of 
bodies; the use of non-calibrated or damaged experimental tools; errors 
in the mechanical models or in the very same physical laws. (It is not that 
the purity of chemical elements is not theoretical in itself, but its isolation, 
manipulation, as well as its description depend on a theory. That is why a 
bad calibrated artifact can be identified as an error in the theory employed 
in the calibration).
Duhem insists that: “The analysis we have given of experiments in 
physics shows fact to be completely interpenetrated by theoretical interpre-
tation, to the point that it becomes impossible to express fact, in isolation 
from theory, in such experiments.”41 Thus, holism gives way to under-
determination, which evidences the separation of theory from concrete 
reality. Indeed, due to this detachment, one can build many theories upon 
the same observational or phenomenal data.
It should be noted that the underdetermination of theory by evidence 
is not only the result of holism, but also the product of abstraction and 
generalization. Duhem claims that the physical theory consists in the 
coordination of experimental laws through theoretical principles and defi-
nitions (like “mass,” “temperature” and “pressure”).42 These have to be 
even more general principles than experimental laws, if they are going 
to unify a set of laws under each principle. Furthermore, these principles 
constitute physical theory. From this, we can infer that there is present 
a kind of gradual ascension towards generality. In fact, the theoretical 
statements and theoretical terms that constitute physical theory keep an 
indirect relationship with the world (which is known to us by our senses), 
although “each of them has an abstract and symbolic meaning,” this 
40. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 180-218.
41. Pierre Duhem, “Logical Examination of Physical Theory,” ed. and trans. Roger Ariew 
and Peter Barker (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996b), 232-237.
42. Ibid., 166.
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meaning, Duhem continues, is “related to concrete realities only by […] 
complicated theoretical intermediaries.”43
We must note that there is a direct relationship between holism 
and generality. The more general becomes our representation of nature, 
the more interconnected the theoretical elements become. These two 
facts explain why physical theory is undetermined by evidence. Both are 
the two sides of the same coin. In fact, it is only when we look into the 
most general part of the theory that holism becomes apparent. Near the 
phenomenal level, although not completely deprived of generality, things 
seem to be less holistic and more responsive to reality individually.
Now, for Duhem, holism is a result of the construction of physical 
theory, and he takes it to make a distinction between physics and meta-
physics. Holism serves to establish a connection beyond that which is 
presented to us in observational data. Since physical theory is not deter-
mined by what is given in experience, our theoretical statements are not 
a direct access to truth. Physical theory involves something which is 
unguaranteed by what the world reveals us through experience. Duhem 
believes that this slack between theory and phenomena is what assures us 
about the division between physics and metaphysics. This consequence is 
due to the fact that the physicist mind puts in something of its own into 
the theory (or “quits” something, through abstraction). This “something” 
refers, among other things, to the generalization of theoretical principles. 
For example, physical laws are generalized to apply to most of the known 
physical phenomena (of course, this also happens in the special sciences 
like biology, chemistry and the social sciences). Therefore, “physical 
theory confers on us a certain knowledge of the external world which is 
irreducible to merely empirical knowledge.’’44
This going beyond the phenomena is evident when we connect these 
laws through theoretical principles. Thus, theory is not a mere reflection 
of reality, it cannot be a thoroughly accurate description of reality. Indeed, 
maybe physical theories can never describe and explain us what and 
how reality is. That is exactly what Duhem thinks. Therefore, concludes 
Duhem, it is impossible for physics to tell us the true nature of reality. 
This task corresponds to metaphysics, which by its very nature is detached 
from physical theory. 
43. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 190.
44. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 312-35.
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The problem with this characterization of metaphysical theorizing 
is that it leaves out too much of what we commonly think as “meta-
physical assertions.” If the general assertions done by physical theory do 
not constitute metaphysical ones, then some claims about the structure of 
space and time would be regarded as merely physical statements. But it 
seems as if the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, and other physical 
theories deal in fact with the nature of space, time and particles, etc. It is 
hard to tell why this kind of claims cannot be counted as metaphysical 
ones from a duhemian point of view.
In effect, this kind of statements were for Duhem metaphysical in 
character. Whenever physical theory pronounces on the nature of some-
thing, it counts as a metaphysical assertion. But it seems to be the main 
product of generalization, and, if holism is right, these products of gener-
alization are linked with the more specific parts of physical theory. The 
result is that there exists a connection between physics and metaphysics.
Although a clear-cut division cannot be provided, this does not 
prevent us from approximately distinguishing the physical from the meta-
physical. In science, we usually ask specific questions like: Do longitude 
and duration vary as a function of the observer’s reference frame? Are 
time and space related with the distribution of matter in the universe? 
We ask even more specific ones: Which is the temporal dilation for the 
observer o? What is the curvature of spacetime given the material distri-
bution d in a particular part p of the universe? The answers to these ques-
tions, if they exist, do not tell us what time and space are. They deal with 
more concrete matters. On the other hand, asking what space and time 
is constitute much more general questions, which we tend to call “meta-
physical.” Nevertheless, the establishment of a precise demarcation seems 
to be misguided. Consider the following examples. 
Generality 1: Time is an entity with properties.
This characterization is very general. It leaves open the possibility 
that the category “time” can be multiply realized. It could be an absolute 
or a relative entity; an entity influenced or not by matter and space; prop-
erties can be relational (Leibniz) or absolute (Newton). Also, it can be 
a psychological projection; the combination of subjective and objective 
properties, etc.
Generality 2: Time is an entity with specific properties like flux and 
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nonrelative simultaneity.
This view is commonly associated with the metaphysical view about 
time called “presentism” (which implies the simultaneity of events in any 
part of the universe. It does not matter whether they are near of faraway). 
This view leaves us with many possibilities too, but less than generality 
1, the characterization of the category “time” can be multiply realized. 
Time could or could not form a single entity with space; time could be 
affected or not by matter and space; it could have relational properties 
(Leibniz) o absolute ones (Newton). In both generality 1 and generality 
2, our evidence comes, as expected, from our daily experiences, not from 
physics. Hence, the categories are highly general.
Generality 3. Time is an entity with even more specific properties. 
This time, considering the constraints given by the theories of rela-
tivity, the multiple realizability of the category “time” is reduced. We seem 
to approximate concrete reality. Still, many of the claims made at this 
stage can somewhat be regarded as “metaphysical.” So, the labeling of 
these claims as “physical” or “metaphysical” is not clearly applicable.
At this level, the evidence consists in the observations and experi-
ments supporting the theories of relativity, e.g., the length contraction 
and time dilation,45 and the deflection of light by the mass of the sun.46 
Relativity restricts the space of possibilities even more. Thus, it is almost 
false (we must be aware that science evolves) that time can be an entity 
independent of space. It is also false that absolute simultaneity exists, 
therefore presentism is false. Though there could exist a relativized 
present.47 Time could not be an entity independent of space; time could 
not be an entity independent of the distribution of matter in the universe.
Clearly, these three levels of generality are not exhaustive. There 
could be much more intermediate levels. Indeed, the theory of relativity 
in its special and general forms leaves out many possibilities. Also, we 
can present these levels of generality in terms of statements, models or, as 
45. Bailey et al., “Measurements of relativistic time dilation for positive and negative mu-
ons in a circular orbit,” Nature 268, (1977): 301.
46. M. P. Hobson. et al. “General Relativity: An Introduction for Physicists.” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 230-46.
47. Steven F. Savvit, “There is not Time like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime),” 
Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): S563-574.
Rogelio Miranda Vilchis100
2018
Vol. 74
Fasc. 1 RPF 2018
Vol. 74
Fasc. 1 RPF
Duhem puts it, in terms that begin with experimental laws and culminates 
in physical theory. But the purpose of this example is only to provide a 
very rough sketch of how it is quite reasonable that our theories about the 
world come in degrees of generality, which are connected by holistic links. 
If this is right then philosophy and science, being important elements 
in our theories of the world, are not completely differentiated activities. 
More specifically: physics is not completely divorced form metaphysics in 
the duhemian sense.
Holism is present in the three kinds of generality presented above. 
In generality 1, our notions of time and property imply many other 
concepts, often found in our common-sense theories. Indeed, our 
common-sense notion of time leaves out it highly vague what the nature 
of time is. However, generality 2 is nearer to our common-sense notion 
of time (almost entirely reflected in Newton’s theory). We tend to believe 
in a flowing thing, divisible into past, present and future, with a constant 
flowing rate which is the same in all parts of the Universe. We cannot 
understand time without associating it with flux, functioning clocks, the 
rising of the sun, the change of seasons, our getting old, and with change 
in general. Many concepts are interrelated here (time, change, clocks, 
seasons, age, and many others) receiving their justiﬁcation from our daily 
experience.
In generality 3 we find a more complex theory, where the achieve-
ments of science have impact in metaphysics, although very loosely. Of 
course, we can discuss much less general theories, but their impact in 
our general notions will be negligible. The only way they can shed some 
light on our notion of time is to become more encompassing. And this 
is attained only through ampliative inferences. But, then, much of the 
detail will be lost. Undoubtedly, Duhem agrees with this when he claims 
that “when we ascent from effects to causes in order to obtain a meta-
physics, starting from some established physical knowledge, as perfect 
and extensive as one would like, we gain a very incomplete and imperfect 
knowledge of the essence of material things.”48
One of the results of holism and generality is that metaphysical 
statements can be confirmed or infirmed but only in a very tenuous way. 
That is to say, it is very difficult to confirm a general statement like those 
dealing with the nature of things. Take the following statement: “space is 
an absolute entity.” Newton maintained that this statement expresses a 
48. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 33.
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truth, Leibniz rejected it favoring, instead, a relationist standpoint. In our 
times it should to be easier to answer this question, but, despite our hopes 
to establish an answer to this debate, it is not that easy to determine the 
real nature of space. Even in the light of our most recent physical theories, 
it seems as if empirical evidence is incapable to resolve the difficulty. 
Indeed, we have alternatives where space is not an entity, or an entity 
quite at odds with our common-sense notion of it. Perhaps, it is a complex 
of relations, and possibly space can be reduced to geometry.49 Maybe, space 
is curved by the distribution of mass and energy as relativity suggest but 
still be Euclidean as Lane argues.50 Nevertheless, the theory of relativity 
seems to support to a higher degree the view that space is something out 
there (the theories of relativity also seem to reject a presentist perspective 
about time).51 Therefore, it is a fact that physics influences metaphysics. In 
fact, Duhem suggests that “all scientific clarity and certainty are a reflection 
of the clarity and an extension of these common-sense truths.”52 Further, it 
influences the metaphysics present in our common-sense notions, which, 
in turn, will figure at the start of scientific enquiry. Common sense is 
specially required at the start of inquiry, at least, to have an idea of what is 
our object of investigation. 
We must also pay attention to the fact that many philosophers have 
argued that metaphysics consists essentially in the mere systematization 
of common sense statements.53 I do not believe this is unexpected consid-
ering the similarity between physics and metaphysics in their use and 
production of very general concepts and assertions. As a result of the 
holistic nature of our theories, common sense is linked to physical theory, 
because the latter is connected to common sense. As Massey rightly notes, 
the physicist “insofar as he is interpreting and transposing these common-
sense facts “into the ideal, abstract, symbolic world created by the theories 
he regards as established,” his experimental results share the infirmational 
status of these theories, i.e., they are as subject to D-holism as any theo-
49. John A., Wheeler, Geometrodynamics (New York: Academic Press, 1963).
50. Craig Lane, The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2000).
51. Savvit, There is not Time like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime). See also Morganti 
Matteo, Combining Science and Metaphysics: Contemporary Physics, Conceptual 
Revision and Common Sense (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 147.
52. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 104.
53. David J. Chalmers and Frank Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive 
Explanation,” Philosophical Review 110, no. 3 (2001): 153-226.
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retical hypothesis.”54 (Here “D-holism” means duhemian holism). We now 
turn to the last duhemian thesis: “natural classification.”
4. Approximation to the essences of things and natural 
classification
So it does not seem that hard to make a naturalistic sense of Duhem 
views on physical theory. In fact, we can derive a naturalistic, gradualist 
and continuist conception of physical and metaphysical theories from 
Duhem’s own views on the matter. Indeed, as we will see, we can meet 
Duhem’s worries with this new conception. I have offered two reasons 
why the distinction Duhem was looking for cannot be accomplished: the 
role of common sense in physical theories, and holism and generality. But 
there is a third: the duhemian notion of “natural classification.”
According to Duhem, “The order in which theory arranges the results 
of observation does not find its adequate and complete justification in its 
practical or aesthetic characteristics, we surmise, in addition, that it is or 
tends to be a natural classification.”55 Physics must be “considered in three 
phases: the observation of facts, the discovery of laws, and the construction 
of theories.”56 We approximate the nature of things gradually. First, “the 
study of phenomena and laws must therefore precede the investigation 
of causes. In the same way, when one ascends a staircase, the highest 
step is the one crossed last.”57 “The mind arrives at the understanding 
of experimental laws through induction, transforming the facts it has 
come to understand.”58 Second, we must “study phenomena and establish 
the laws of succession they follow.” Finally, “we must induce from these 
phenomena the properties of the substances that cause them.”59 So, “a 
third phase is conjoined to the two others. This is the theoretical phase.”60
In this third phase “All hypotheses are something other than simple 
translations of an experimental law. They are the results of a transfor-
54. Gerald J. Massey, “Quine and Duhem On Holistic Testing” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2011): 248-9.
55. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 335.
56. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 30.
57. Ibid., 32.
58. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 1.
59. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 31.
60. Ibid., 35-6.
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mation imposed on an experimental law by the mind of a physicist.”61 This 
intrusion of the mind is necessary for in the absence of “the systematic 
connection that speculation establishes among them, the laws given by 
experimentation form a confused and inseparable mass.”62 One example is 
the postulation of the aether, where we begin imagining that 
the constitution of this medium in such a way that its mechanical 
properties would be able to form a symbol of all the laws of optics. Color 
would then be symbolized by the period of a certain vibratory motion 
propagated in this medium, intensity by the mean kinetic energy of this 
motion; and the laws of propagation for light, reflection, and refraction 
would result from the application to this medium of theorems provided 
by the theory of elasticity.63 
Beyond the third phase we arrive at the truths of metaphysics, 
which are “propositions few in number and, for the most part, negative 
in form, which we obtain in ascending from observed phenomena to the 
substances which cause them.”64 His talking of metaphysical truths allows 
us to establish a connection between physical theory and these truths, 
because we obtain them precisely in ascending form the observed to the 
nature of things. At a higher degree of speculation, Duhem claims, we 
find a metaphysical system. Although Duhem wanted to distinguish meta-
physical propositions from metaphysical systems, this distinction must be 
best viewed as gradual. In fact, Duhem believes that a metaphysical system 
“is a collection of positive judgements […] Such a system is acceptable 
provided none of the hypotheses composing it conflicts with an estab-
lished metaphysical truth. But it remains always highly problematic and 
never forces itself on reason in an unavoidable fashion.”65 In making this 
assertion, Duhem is prompting a connection between metaphysical truths 
and metaphysical systems in that the metaphysical system “is acceptable 
provided none of the hypotheses composing it conflicts with an estab-
lished metaphysical truth.”66
So, in Duhem’s view, physics presents, at least tacitly, different layers 
of generality. In the second phase, we go beyond the phenomena to the 
61. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 11.
62. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 26.
63. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 12.
64. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 33.
65. Ibid., 33.
66. Ibid., 33.
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experimental laws by induction (at this stage, we usually associate facts 
with a mathematical structure [often algebraic of geometrical], and we get 
a physical law). The generalization does not end here. A third phase intro-
duces concepts which serve as summaries of sets of experimental laws. It 
classifies, organizes and systematizes the great number of dispersed lawful 
connections between phenomena. Here, Duhem is introducing something 
similar to a gradualism-continuist approach, except for the fact that he 
does not seem to recognize the incipient presence of metaphysics at the 
most theoretical end of physical theory. 
In fact, Duhem insists that,
From the knowledge of phenomena, we can draw some knowledge of 
the things themselves, because they are the efficient causes of these 
phenomena and because knowledge of an effect provides us with some 
information of the substance that causes this effect, without giving us, 
however, a full and adequate knowledge of that substance.67
This squares perfectly with the gradualist and continuist view. This 
does not imply that science gives us complete knowledge of the structure 
of reality. I agree with Duhem that it is a fundamental fact of science that it 
cannot offer us a thorough explanation of the world. Be as it may, Duhem 
gives support to the thesis that: that metaphysics is not completely divorced 
from physics, except for that generality which characterizes the first. It 
is very difficult to establish a clear borderline between what counts as 
physical theory and what as metaphysical theory, when we are expanding 
our physical principles more and more. Although Duhem did not believe 
this characterization is correct, he is, in some sense, pointing to a similar 
view when he claims that “the more hypotheses are separated from the 
experimental laws that led to their conception, the more physicists have 
put in themselves into the law’s statements.”68 Is there a reason to make a 
clear distinction between physical and metaphysical hypotheses? In fact, 
when choosing between distinct hypotheses, some “can be simpler, and 
more natural or can translate experimental results more immediately.”69 
But, where must we place the dividing line? Duhem does not offer any 
answer to this question.
67. Ibid., 31.
68. Duhem, Some Reflections on the Subject of Physical Theories, 11.
69. Ibid., 23.
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As the quote above shows, Duhem acknowledges that there is some 
approximation to the real nature of things, the real nature of reality. He 
regularly employs the term “natural classification” to refer to this continual 
approximation:
Physical theory never gives us the explanation of experimental laws; it 
never reveals realities hiding under the sensible appearances, but the 
more complete it becomes the more we apprehend that the logical order 
in which theory orders experimental laws as the reflection of an onto-
logical order; the data of observations correspond to real relation among 
things, and the more we feel that theory tends to be a natural classifica-
tion.70
So it is reasonable to claim that “an instrumentalist interpretation 
of Duhemian epistemology isn’t in harmony with an important idea of 
the French physicist: the physical theory is a natural classification and it 
slowly progress.”71 It is also true that Duhem allows us to interpret him 
as endorsing a gradual ascension to things themselves, in the sense that 
“The physical theory uncovers, at least partially, the veil which conceals 
the being itself of things.”72 Therefore, “the conviction that physical theory 
approximates a natural classification is at once the belief that it approx-
imates a true classification. This seems to be in line with the realist’s 
thought that physical theories are, at least approximately, true.”73
In any case, we can bring out a layered picture of our theoretical 
efforts to understand the world. At its most specific and concrete end 
we can find statements describing and explaining particulars. At the 
other end of the spectrum we find the metaphysical statements in their 
full generality. For example, the determinism we encounter in cartesian 
mechanical metaphysics must be understood as offering us a conception 
of determinism of a very high level of generality. At the point that deter-
minism goes beyond its restricted application to a particular set of objects 
confined to a particular location and time, it becomes to some extent a 
70. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 26-7.
71. Mirella Fortino, “Physics and Metaphysics in Pierre Duhem,” Logic and Philosophy of 
Science 9, no. 1 (2011): 299.
72. Alain Boutot, «Physique et Métaphysique Chez Pierre Duhem, » Les Études philoso-
phiques 2, no. 1 (1994): 248.
73. Karen Merikangas Darling, “Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for 
Pierre Duhem,” Philosophy of Science 70, no. 5 (2002): 1129. 
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typical metaphysical claim. It is “theoretical and philosophical, to the 
extent that it is universal.”74
The deterministic laws often apply with great accuracy in the 
restricted domains, where there are few entities and in circumscribed 
localizations across space and time. These laws are usually very specific. 
But, beyond their particular domain of application these laws tend to lose 
precision; ceteris paribus clauses become more and more important. 
It is only in its most general form, in metaphysical theories, that 
determinism appears to be a metaphysical claim. As was mentioned above, 
often, when dealing with concrete things, the vocabulary employed seems 
to be very different from that employed to talk about the world as a whole. 
For example, when we try to explain the most fundamental structure of 
reality we usually employ terms like “property,” “substance” and “relation.” 
When we describe specific and concrete aspects of the world, as the various 
sciences try to do, we employ a different set of concepts like “field,” “atom,” 
“mammal,” “money,” etc. Although, these terms are also very general, 
they are more specific and concrete than the metaphysical ones. But this 
distinctive vocabulary does not mark a clear distinction between physics 
and metaphysics. In fact, as Cartwright claims, most of what we say “uses 
abstract concepts that want ‘fitting out’ in more concrete ways. Of course, 
that is compared to yet another level of discourse in terms of which they 
may be more concretely fitted out in turn.”75
It is a fact that to a certain extent we can pursue physics without hard 
reliance on metaphysics, but this fact is explained by the very generality of 
the second. The generality of its concepts assures that scientific research, 
which focuses on the details, is not at odds with our metaphysical views. 
But, as we have seen, this is a matter of degree. Certainly, scientific 
research on the nature of time and space has important consequences for 
our metaphysics, although still in a small degree. These discussions are in 
the middle of physics and metaphysics. Progress is secured, not because 
physical research is independent of metaphysics, but because physics is 
interested in the specific and concrete details. And it is in the details where 
progress is to be found. I am not suggesting that there is not any kind 
of progress in metaphysics, but that compared with that of physics, it is 
minimal.
74. René Poirier, “L’Epistémologie de P. Duhem et sa Valeur Actuelle.” Les Études 
philosophiques 22, no. 4 (1967): 416.
75. Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 40.
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Duhem is wrong in trying to establish a borderline between physics 
and metaphysic so as to secure the first in the path of progress. The internal 
dissensions of metaphysics cannot produce the same kinds of dissensions 
in physics, because physical theories can proceed relatively easy apart 
from the metaphysical ones.
Despite this minimal contact between these disciplines, to advocate 
a complete independence of one from another is inappropriate, as Duhem 
does. According to Duhem, these disciplines cannot enter into contra-
diction, physical propositions cannot “ever be in contradiction with a 
metaphysical truth,”76 but this seems inexact. The fact that their interre-
lationship is very subtle does not mean that they do not enter into contra-
diction, at least in a negligible way. It is false that the theoretical (often the 
most theoretical) “in classifying a set of laws […] adds absolutely nothing 
to the content of those laws”;77 that “the physicist cannot and must not 
accept conflict except with a physicist.”78
So far, I have been criticizing Duhem’s conclusion on the grounds 
that it is more feasible to derive a gradualist and continuist conception of 
our theories about the world from his own philosophical commitments. 
Now I will argue that our gradualist and continuist approach resolves 
some important issues that prompted Duhem to hypothesize a clear-cut 
distinction between physics and metaphysics. 
5. Duhemian theses from a gradualist and continuist point of view
The duhemian metascientific and metaphilosophical views tell us 
something very important about the distinction between metaphysics and 
physics. And more broadly, between the distinction between philosophy 
and science. Among his insights, we find: (i) there is pervasive disagreement 
within metaphysics which cannot be fixed by physics; (ii) physics and 
metaphysics are somewhat independent activities and theories about the 
world; (iii) metaphysics is meaningful.
Duhem observes that metaphysics cannot reign over physics, because 
it is extremely difficult to find agreement in metaphysics.79 There is 
another way metaphysics cannot influence physics, and that is the fact 
76. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 36.
77. Ibid., 37.
78. Ibid., 38.
79. Ibid., 34
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that, in Duhem’s view, metaphysical systems cannot imply physical laws 
and particular observations under the scope of scientific analysis. Even 
if we can, from phenomena, ascend to negative metaphysical judgments, 
which delineate the real nature of things, we cannot deduce physical 
observations from a metaphysical system (which, besides being more 
general, consists of a set of positive metaphysical judgments). This is due 
to the fact that in defining the nature of things “the view we have of them 
remains too general and too little determinate, to enable us to foresee the 
existence of a new class of phenomena or to anticipate a new physical 
law.”80 In fact, it seems as if “physics alone can decide if this proposition 
is correct or incorrect.”81
I agree with Duhem in this respect, but this is due precisely to the 
fact that metaphysics is more general. Duhem views physics as an activity 
which must be separated form metaphysics in order for the latter to 
progress. That is, Duhem sees progress in physics as attainable only if 
physics is autonomous, because, as we have said, metaphysics seems to 
lack progress. This is seen as a consequence of the pervasive disagreement 
between and within the numerous metaphysical systems. Surely Duhem 
is right in his analysis of this perennial difference in opinion. But the lack 
of progress derives from the low attention metaphysics puts in the details. 
By its very nature, metaphysics is incapable of making the progress 
we see in the physical sciences. But, there is still likely some progress to 
be found. For example, it may be argued that the theory of relativity (both, 
special and general) sheds light on the nature of space and time. From 
this theory, we seem to be more justified in believing that time and space 
constitute just one entity: spacetime; that our notion about the present 
time is inadequate, and that matter affects spacetime.82 
I find Duhem’s observations very helpful for the establishment of 
what this work tries to demonstrate. If physics and metaphysics are distin-
guished in the way they are related to the world, and this relation is a 
matter of degree in function of the generality of theories, then it is not 
surprise that it is very hard to figure out how metaphysics can influence 
physics in any way. The converse is also true, how can physics influence 
metaphysics? But as we have seen, it is possible. The examples about 
80. Ibid., 33.
81. Ibid., 34.
82. Norton, John. 2014. “What Can We Learn about the Ontology of Space and Time from 
the Theory of Relativity?” in Physical Theory: Method and Interpretation, ed. by L. 
Sklar. New York: Oxford University Press.
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the nature of space and time show us that the apparent insurmountable 
differences between the two kinds of theories we are examining can be 
explained by this appeal to differences in degree.
If the gradualist and continuist view is correct, then Duhem is wrong 
in thinking that “Metaphysical systems present to us a definition of the 
nature of things more detailed and more determinate than that furnished 
by demonstrated metaphysical truths.”83 It is just an appearance, meta-
physical concepts –which compose metaphysical truths– are very general, 
so, in a sense, they apply to a large set of things (probably each and every 
one of the entities that populate the universe). To achieve this universality, 
these concepts have to abstract away and idealize their objects, leading 
to greater generality. But, they also refer (derivatively) to concrete partic-
ulars, being these elements of a set. The cartesian term “extension” is 
very general, because it refers to a large set of objects, but, at the same 
time, it refers to each one of the elements of the set. That is why Duhem 
tells us that metaphysical systems present us a more detailed definition 
of the nature of things: the general concepts figuring in the metaphysical 
systems comprise almost any individual in this world. But, in contrast, 
these general concepts present to us a vague image of each individual in 
particular. For a concrete and detailed description of a restricted set of 
objects, or a particular object we would need concrete concepts. In this 
way, we descend from the most general metaphysical systems through 
metaphysical principles (and other intermediate principles) to the most 
concrete representations of the world. One promising candidate for this 
last role might be fulfilled by the so called “phenomenological models,” 
which, like fables, “transform the abstract into the concrete.”84 These 
models are more precise and concrete in the description of the world 
It is not beyond doubt that “while a physical consequence deduced 
form some metaphysical propositions participates in the certainty of 
the latter, a physical consequence deduced from a metaphysical system 
suffers from the doubtful and problematic character affecting the system 
itself and cannot be regarded as established.”85 The problem lies in the 
distinction between metaphysical propositions and metaphysical systems. 
It is better seen as a matter of degree. 
83. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 33.
84. Cartwright, “The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science,” 36.
85. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 34.
Rogelio Miranda Vilchis110
2018
Vol. 74
Fasc. 1 RPF 2018
Vol. 74
Fasc. 1 RPF
Concerning (ii), Duhem pointed out that physics works independently 
of metaphysics. I think that Duhem is right, although this assertion should 
be rephrased as: physics and metaphysics are almost independent activ-
ities and theories about the world.
This approach also supports the duhemian view that in practice86 
a true physics cannot be deduced from the knowledge of the nature of 
things provided by metaphysics. If metaphysical theories are underdeter-
mined, as I have argued, then many observational consequences could be 
derived. No unique set of phenomena could be derived from the theory; 
no metaphysical system could be established as the correct. It also is quite 
compatible with the duhemian view that, in theory, a true physics could 
be deduced from metaphysics. But this possibility seems very distant. This 
is due mainly by the inextricable general nature of our theories about the 
world.
As it was mentioned in the introduction, Duhem advocated the 
distinction between physics and metaphysics mainly because he wanted 
to guard his religious beliefs from attacks coming from the metaphysical 
principles derived from the scientific ones. But, if the metaphysical claims 
are localized at the most general part of our theories about the world, 
then, by its very nature, they are the most immune. They are so vague 
that empirical evidence has little impact on them. It is extremely hard 
to envision how to confirm or infirm them. This explains why it seems 
“absurd to seek among the truth of metaphysics either the confirmation or 
the refutation of a physical theory,”87 and it seems impossible to “declare 
the following proposition true: All physical phenomena are explained 
mechanically.”88 It is impossible, Duhem continues, “to declare it false. 
This proposition transcends physical method.” So, given that theological 
assumptions are metaphysical in character, the empirical evidence has a 
negligible impact on them.
Another reason why theological truths cannot be threatened lies in 
the character of these truths. Some of them are considered to be beyond 
the reach even of our metaphysical principles (the latter derived partially 
from physical ones). Some are considered to be beyond even of our logic: 
“the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing.”89 In this sense 
86. Duhem, Physics and Metaphysics, 32.
87. Ibid., 37.
88. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 273-311.
89. Blaise Pascal, Les Pensées de Pascal (Paris : P. Lethielleux, 1896), 24.
The Distinction Between Physics and Metaphysics in Duhem’s Philosophy 111
2018
Vol. 74
Fasc. 1 RPF 2018
Vol. 74
Fasc. 1 RPF
it is inevitably that the judgements of physics and theology “can neither 
contradict nor agree with each other.”90 
Finally, (iii) is also preserved, although in a slightly different way. 
Duhem was not a positivist. He did not deny the cognitive importance of 
metaphysics. He did not take physics to be the only access to reality, as 
many members of the Vienna circle did. Physical theory and metaphysical 
theory, each on its own tells us something about reality. In a gradualist and 
continuist view this is preserved to a certain extent. Physics in its most 
theoretical part can hardly shows us something about reality, but it is not 
impossible (as mentioned above about the nature of time and space). So, 
in this sense, the cognitive quality of metaphysics is preserved. 
Perhaps this would not be very satisfying to Duhem, but I leave open 
the possibility that there exist religious truths which, of course, are beyond 
the reach of our imprecise metaphysical theories. As we noted above, these 
truths are often understood as beyond the reach of logic, therefore physics 
cannot have access to these truths. However, it does not entail that physics 
is completely detached from the most common metaphysical truths (e.g., 
about time and space). 
6. Conclusion
In this paper I proposed to critically analyze Duhem’s views on the 
relationship between physics and metaphysics which, broadly under-
stood, have also implications for the relationship between science and 
philosophy. Some of Duhem basic tenets such as the physicist reliance 
on common sense; the holistic nature of physical theories, and the idea 
of “natural classification” as an ideal to which physical theory constantly 
approaches, lead us to a rejection of the distinction between physics and 
metaphysics.
If the analysis is right, then it is reasonable to derive a gradualist and 
continuist perspective about physics and metaphysics from Duhem own 
views. Despite appearances to the contrary, the rejection of the distinction 
between physics and metaphysics does not undermine the basic duhemian 
theses. After all, the present proposal preserves the essential properties of 
what Duhem though was the aim of physical theory.
90. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 285.
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